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Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: 
An Analysis of the Indus Waters Treaty 
    * Dr. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi 
 
 
Abstract: 
Since India and Pakistan’s independence in 1947, both states have fought 
over the occupied territories of Kashmir to gain control of water supplies, 
which are strategically valuable.  Even in recent times, the countries are 
facing constant threats from each other over several separate issues.  India 
and Pakistan’s water conflicts are long-standing and relate to Indian 
infrastructure on the western tributaries.  Pakistan is of the view that India is 
robbing Pakistan’s water supplies and building its water management 
capacity only as a political maneuver to gain political supremacy by 
practicing hydro-hegemony.  On the other hand, India maintains that it is only 
constructing infrastructure within the scope of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), 
and the decreased water flows in Pakistan are due to climate change.  Owing 
to Indian construction works on the western rivers and the Pakistani interest 
in safeguarding its water supplies, water disputes are routinely referred to the 
legal mechanism prescribed in the IWT.  Recently, the tension over water 
conflicts between India and Pakistan has been soaring.  India has threatened 
that it will scrap the IWT entirely.  In response, Pakistan has stated that such 
a revocation of a bilaterally agreed treaty would be considered an act of war.  
This extraordinary intensity in political rigidity between Pakistan and India 
has a solution enshrined in the legal framework of the IWT to alleviate water 
disputes.  This paper seeks to explore the legal framework of the dispute 
resolution mechanism under the IWT, and further investigates the weaknesses 
and strengths of the prescribed mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan. 
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Introduction 
 
Owing to a global surge in population and water scarcity, water conflicts 
over freshwater resources are expected to increase in the future.1  Within the 
next three decades the global population is estimated to grow at an alarming 
rate.  In 1995, the world’s population was estimated to be 5.7 billion people;2 
by the year 2025, owing to the surge in population, this number will reach 8 
billion people.3  This means that the constant aggregate freshwater will be 
shared among an increased population and therefore global per capita water 
availability is destined to decline dramatically.4 
In addition to the worldwide increase in population growth and the 
subsequent decline in per capita water supply, certain other contingent aspects 
also account for water scarcity in the world.  For example, the rise in sea level 
has increased the salinity of groundwater, which has considerably diminished 
water supplies.5  Similarly, the melting of the glaciers and climate change are 
responsible for causing droughts and floods, which have also distressed water 
supplies.6  Consequently, owing to the boost in global population and water 
shortage, worldwide water disputes are expected to rise substantially in the 
near future.7 
Water disputes can be traced back thousands of years.8  Water conflicts 
are encounters between nations because of disagreements over water 
resources, for example river basins.9  It is estimated that worldwide there are 
more than 250 river basins that share their waters with more than one nation.10  
                                                 
1 See A K CHATURVEDI, WATER: A SOURCE FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS 70 (Vij Books India Pvt ed., 
2013).  
2 Jeff Crisp et al., Population and Human Relations: Year in Review 1995, ENCYC. BRITANNICA 
(2017), https://www.britannica.com/science/population-biology-and-anthropology-Year-In-Review-
1995. 
3 Nat’l Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World 19 (Nov. 2008). 
4 See CHATURVEDI, supra note 1, at 70. 
5 ANTOANETA YOTOVA, CLIMATE CHANGE, HUMAN SYSTEMS AND POLICY: V. 2, at 6 (2nd vol. 2009). 
6 MARTIN PARRY, CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 
187 (2007). 
7 See CHATURVEDI, supra note 1, at 70. 
8 For example, the war over water in Mesopotamian city of Iraq 4,500 years ago.  See MANAS 
CHATTERJI, CONFLICT AND PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA 271 (B. M. Jain ed., 2008). 
9 See V. J. JOHN, WATER STRUGGLE 4 (V. J. John ed., 2007). 
10 More accurately, there are 263 river basins that cross international boundaries.  See INES 
DOMBROWSKY, CONFLICT, COOPERATION AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER 
MANAGEMENT 3 (Jeroen C.J.M Van Den Bergh ed., 2007). 
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Almost 40 percent of the global population lives around these river basins,11 
and owing to their conflicting interests, at least 100 countries are close to 
water conflict.12  More precisely, four sizable river basins are already facing 
water disputes,13 and another 17 are at great risk of water conflict.14  In the 
last 60 years, more than 40 water conflicts have been reported, largely in the 
regions of the Middle East.15 
Scholars and influential people have predicted water wars over the race 
to capture water supplies.  Within this context, Kofi Annan stated in 2002 that 
“fierce national competition over water resources has prompted fears that 
water issues contain the seeds of violent conflict.”16   Relatedly, the vice 
president of the World Bank, Ismail Serageldin, noted in 1995 that “[i]f the 
wars of this century were fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be 
fought over water.”17  Despite this global rise in the possibility of water wars 
and water conflicts, 18 full-scale water wars have not come about because the 
dispute resolution mechanism resolves such conflicts.19  Therefore, this paper 
is an attempt to investigate the various dispute resolution mechanisms used in 
international and regional settings to placate water conflicts between nations. 
Since India and Pakistan’s independence in 1947, both states have fought 
over the occupied territories of Kashmir to gain control of water supplies, 
which are strategically valuable.20  Even in recent times, both countries have 
faced constant threats from each other over several separate issues.21  India 
                                                 
11 G. TYLER MILLER, JR. & SCOTT SPOOLMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 242 (Christopher Elgado 
et al. eds.,13th ed. 2010). 
12 KAZUO YAMAMOTO ET AL., SOUTHEAST ASIAN WATER ENVIRONMENT 5, 207 (K. Yamamoto et al. 
eds., 2013). 
13  More particularly, Indus, Nile, Euphrates, Jordan, and others.  See INT’L BUREAU OF THE 
PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 132-40 (5th 
vol. 2003) [hereinafter WATER DISPUTES]. 
14 EDITH BROWN WEISS, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR A WATER-SCARCE WORLD 121 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2013). 
15 See Id. at 122.  
16 NAYAN SHARMA, RIVER SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 354 (Nayan Sharma ed., 2017). 
17 VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION, AND PROFIT, at ix (2016). 
18 JULIAN CRIBB, THE COMING FAMINE: THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO AVOID 
IT 22 (2010). 
19 ORLIN NIKOLOV & SWATHI VEERAVALLI, IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISASTERS ON 
MILITARY ACTIVITIES 140 (Orlin Nikolov & Swathi Veeravalli eds., 2017). 
20 RAVI KALIA, PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL LABYRINTHS: MILITARY, SOCIETY AND TERROR 7-8 (Ravi 
Kalia ed., 2016). 
21  See generally DR. S K SHAH, INDIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS: RENEWED THREATS AND NEW 
DIRECTIONS (2017). 
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and Pakistan’s water conflicts have their own long list against Indian 
infrastructure on the western tributaries.22  Pakistan is of the view that India 
is robbing Pakistan’s water supplies and building its water management 
capacity only as a political maneuver to gain political supremacy by practicing 
hydro-hegemony. 23   On the other hand, India maintains that it is only 
constructing infrastructure within the scope of the Indus Waters Treaty 
(“IWT”), and the decreased water flows in Pakistan are due to climate 
change.24  Owing to Indian construction works on the western rivers and the 
Pakistani interest in safeguarding its water supplies, water disputes are 
routinely referred to the legal mechanism prescribed in the IWT.25 
Recently, the tension over water conflicts between India and Pakistan has 
soared. 26   India has threatened that it will scrap the IWT entirely. 27   In 
response, Pakistan has stated that such a revocation of a bilaterally agreed 
treaty would be considered an act of war.28  This extraordinary intensity in 
political rigidity between Pakistan and India has a solution enshrined in the 
legal framework of the IWT to alleviate water disputes.29 
This paper seeks to explore the legal framework of the dispute resolution 
mechanism under the IWT and further investigates the weaknesses and 
strengths of that mechanism.  To maintain impartiality, the concerns of both 
nations with regard to the flaws in the dispute resolution mechanism will be 
explored and weighed in the equation of exploring the suitability of the IWT 
legal framework.  Furthermore, to evaluate equitableness and to assess 
contemporary apparatuses, the ability of the IWT dispute resolution 
                                                 
22 See ZAFAR ADEEL & ROBERT G. WIRSING, IMAGINING INDUSTAN 198 (Zafar Adeel & Robert G. 
Wirsing eds., 2017). 
23 See generally Abdul Rauf Iqbal, Hydro-Politics in India and its Impact on Pakistan, ISSRA PAPERS 
(2014), 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:v7wMqC6TDmwJ:www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/is
sra_pub/articles/issra-paper/ISSRA_Papers_Vol6_IssueI_2014/05-Hydro-Politics-in-India-Abdul-
Rauf-Iqbal.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. 
24  CHRISTIAN PARENTI, TROPIC OF CHAOS: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF 
VIOLENCE 129 (20122012(e Change and the New Geography) 
25 See infra Kishenganga, supra note 94; Section 4.3.  
26 Iqbal, supra note 23, at 49-68. 
27  Khalid Chandio, India Re-thinking Indus Water Treaty, IPRI (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://www.ipripak.org/india-re-thinking-indus-water-treaty/; see BHARAT VERMA, INDIAN DEFENCE 
REVIEW (Bhart Verma ed., 2008); see also Revocation of Indus Waters Treaty Can Be Taken as an 
Act of War: Sartaj Aziz, DAWN.COM (https://www.dawn.com/news/1286437 (last updated Sept. 27, 
2016) [hereinafter Aziz]. 
28Aziz, supra note 27. 
29 See Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., art. IX, Sept. 19, 1960, I.U.C.N. 
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mechanism to keep up with emerging modern issues will be briefly compared 
with dispute resolution mechanisms in international law and other similar 
treaties. 
This paper is divided into five sections, as summarized below. 
Section 1 will explore the dispute resolution mechanism in general.  This 
section is composed of two subsections.  Section1.1 will succinctly explore 
the juridical dispute resolution mechanism.  To illustrate the benefits of the 
juridical dispute resolution mechanism, certain examples with reference to 
international water disputes among co-riparian states of international river 
basins will be set out within this section.  For instance, cases of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”), the predecessor of the  the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), and the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(“PCoA”) will be briefly discussed within this subsection.  Section 1.2 will 
generally examine nonjuridical dispute resolution techniques and procedures.  
In this subsection, notions of the fact-finding commission, mediation, and 
negotiation as nonjuridical dispute resolution mechanisms will be set out 
briefly. 
Section 2 will briefly perceive the installed nature and type of dispute 
resolution mechanisms in international river basins.  This section is further 
divided into three subsections.  Section 2.1 will analyze the international water 
basin of the Euphrates.  Section 2.2 will scrutinize the international river 
basins of the Nile, the Jordan, and other international river basins of 
considerable size and global effect.  Section 3.2 will concisely explore the 
Indus Basin. 
Section 3 will explore the multilayered dispute resolution mechanism 
under the IWT.  This section is comprised of five subsections.  Section 3.1 
will explore the first available forum for dispute resolution under the IWT.  
Here, issues are questions of fact that are determined by the Permanent Indus 
Commission (“PIC”).  Section 3.2 will define the second forum of dispute 
resolution under the IWT.  At this stage of dispute resolution, differences 
between India and Pakistan over water conflicts are to be solved through a 
neutral expert.30   Section 3.3 will examine the third stage of the dispute 
resolution mechanism under the IWT.  At this stage, India and Pakistan water 
dispute is to be resolved through diplomatic talks and bilateral negotiations 
between India and Pakistan.31  Section 3.4 will briefly explore the Court of 
                                                 
30 See Indus Water Treaty art. IX(2), supra note 29. 
31 See Indus Water Treaty art. IX(3), supra note 29.  
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Arbitration as a last resort to settle disputes between India and Pakistan under 
dispute resolution mechanism of the IWT. 
Section 4 of this paper will explore the efficacy of the IWT dispute 
resolution mechanism.  Consequently, time span/time consumed at various 
stages of the resolution of certain water conflicts will be noted in the context 
of Indian projects over the western waters.  This section has five subsections 
that will analyze the proficiency of the IWT dispute resolution mechanism 
during water disputes between India and Pakistan.  Section 4.1 deals with the 
Salal project, Section 4.2 with the Tulbul Navigation project, Section 4.3 with 
the Baglihar project, Section 4.4 with the Kishanganga project, and Section 
4.5 with the Chutak project. 
After this, to recommend the effective use of the dispute resolution 
mechanism under the IWT, Section 5 will analyze Indian obligations under 
the IWT and explore the Indian and Pakistani arguments against the 
ineffectiveness of the dispute resolution mechanism.  In order to build such a 
nexus between the inefficacy of the legal framework under the IWT and 
Indian obligations under the IWT, certain provisions of the IWT will be set 
out within this section.  Furthermore, brief recommendations to speed up the 
existing framework to resolve water disputes will be proposed in this section. 
 
1. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 
In contemporary times, water conflicts over water utilization and water 
apportionment have become more complex owing to emerging water scarcity 
and prevailing needs, especially owing to water’s exceptional use in mass 
food production, power production, and other similar economic utilities.32  To 
cater for these evolving aspects of water conflicts, complex dispute resolution 
mechanisms have been devised.33  Water conflicts in current times can be 
described in the following way: there are usually two or more states in conflict 
over international river basins or transboundary aquifers.34  Typically, the 
conflict is over water apportionment, water navigation, water management 
projects, or border separation of international waters.35  In most cases, the 
                                                 
32 WEISS, supra note 14, at 122-28. 
33 See Id. 
34 JOHN, supra note 9, at 4.  More accurately, there are 263 river basins that cross international 
boundaries.  See DOMBROWSKY, supra note 10, at 3.  
35 See, e.g., European Commission of Danube Between Galatz and Braila, Advisory Opinion, 1927 
PCIJ (ser. B) No. 14 (Dec. 8, 1927) [hereinafter Danube], 
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.12.08_danube.htm; Case relating to the 
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governing law is a bilaterally or multilaterally agreed treaty, and the 
prescribed mechanism for dispute resolution within these mechanisms should 
be followed in these cases. 36   In cases where there is no treaty, the 
international law of dispute resolution is appropriate to act as a legal 
framework.37   In either case, disputes are typically referred to arbitration 
courts for mediation or required to be resolved by juridical and non-juridical 
dispute settlement procedures.38 
There are certain legal mechanisms available in international law that can 
peacefully resolve water conflicts between nations. 39   States can always 
individually resolve their conflicts using diplomatic negotiations to resolve 
the tensions.40  This method is usually the first available recourse to placate 
international tensions.41  This forum includes approaches such as diplomatic 
negotiations, mediation, fact-finding commissions, and other similar 
intermediary techniques.  This preliminary stage is nonbinding in nature.42  
After exhausting this forum, if the dispute still remains unresolved, parties to 
a conflict have the option to refer the dispute to the available legal framework 
of juridical settlement.  This method is binding in nature.  This method 
includes arbitration and judicial dispute resolution by international courts and 
tribunals.43  Several agreements choose to recourse to one or both kinds of 
dispute resolution mechanism.  Parties to treaties agree to avail themselves of 
third party mediation or juridical settlement because water conflicts involve 
                                                 
Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder (U.K. v. Pol.), 1929 PCIJ 
(ser. A) No. 23 (Sept. 10, 1929) [hereinafter River Order], 
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1929.09.10_river_oder.htm; Diversion of Water 
from Meuse (Neth. V. Belg.), 1937 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 70 (June 28), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1937.06.28_meuse.htm; Frontier Dispute (Benin v. 
Niger), 2005 I.C.J 90 (July 12), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/icj/eng/decisions/2005.07.12_frontier_dispute.htm; Certain Activities 
Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area.  Costa Rica v. Nicar., 2011 I.C.J. 
36 Danube, supra note 35.  
37 See WEISS, supra note 14, at 126–28. 
38 See generally WATER DISPUTES, supra note 13. 
39 For instance, dispute resolution through the PCA and the ICJ. 
40 See Indus Water Treaty art. IX, supra note 29; see also United Nations Convention on  
 the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
 art. 33, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter Convention]; WEISS, supra note 14, at 128. 
41 See Indus Water Treaty art. IX, supra note 29; see also Convention, supra note 40; WEISS, supra 
note 14, at 128. 
42 WEISS, supra note 14, at 128. 
43 See Id. at 128–56. 
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complex aspects of water utilization. 44   These water conflicts vary from 
polluting water supplies, diverting watercourses, and building water 
management infrastructure to other contingent aspects of protecting water 
interests.45 
Therefore, this section is divided into two subsections.  Section 1.1 will 
succinctly explore the juridical dispute resolution mechanism.  To illustrate 
the benefits of the juridical dispute resolution mechanism, certain examples 
with reference to international water disputes among co-riparian states of 
international river basins will be set out within this subsection.  For instance, 
cases of the Permanent Court of International Justice (“P.C.I.J”), the 
predecessor of the I.C.J, the I.C.J., and the PCA will be briefly discussed 
within this subsection. 
Section 1.2 will examine generally the non-juridical dispute resolution 
techniques and procedures.  In this subsection, notions of fact-finding 
commissions, mediation, and negotiation as non-juridical dispute resolution 
mechanisms will be set out briefly. 
 
1.1. Juridical Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 
International law provides several venues to accommodate dispute 
resolution between states.  Various international conventions and treaty laws 
have anticipated a need for a juridical and diplomatic legal mechanism to 
resolve international disputes.46  In time, states have brought their issues to 
these forums to resolve their issues judicially.47 
 
1.1.1. Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) Cases 
 
Up until the establishment of the I.C.J., the P.C.I.J. dealt with 
international disputes between states.48  Both courts have adjudicated over 
                                                 
44 Indus Water Treaty art. IX, supra note 29.  See also Convention, supra note 40; WEISS, supra note 
14, at 128. 
45 See WEISS, supra note 14, at 128–56. 
46 See Id. at 128–30.  
47 See Diversion of Water from Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70 (June 28) 
[hereinafter Meuse]; see also Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. 
Nicar.), Judgement, 2009 I.C.J. 213 (July 13) [hereinafter Dispute]; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20) [hereinafter Pulp Mills]; Rhine Chlorides 
Arbitration (Neth./Fr.), No. 2000-02, Award, Perm. Ct. Arb. (2004). 
48  ALEXANDER MIKABERIDZE, ATROCITIES, MASSACRES, AND WAR CRIMES 291 (Alexander 
Mikaberidze ed., vol. 1, 2013). 
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cases of water apportionment, water navigation, water demarcation, and 
interpretation of treaty laws among co-riparian states.49 
For instance, in 1927 the P.C.I.J. gave its advisory opinion to demarcate 
jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, between Galatz and 
Braila about the navigation of watercourses.50 
In a very similar case, in 1929 the P.C.I.J. concluded its International 
Commission of the River Oder between Germany, Denmark, France, Great 
Britain, Sweden and Czechoslovakia and Poland, regarding the navigability 
of the river waters.51  This case was brought to interpret the scope of Articles 
331, 241, and 343 of the Treaty of Versailles.52 
Similarly, in the case between Britain and Belgium, the P.C.I.J. decided 
the legitimacy of water navigation in 1934, this case is also known as the 
Oscar Chin case.53  Further, the PCIJ adjudicated over the navigability of the 
River Meuse, between the Netherlands and Belgium, in 1937.54  This case also 
required the PCIJ to assess the violation of a treaty between the Netherlands 
and Belgium that was agreed in 1863.55  Both states contended that other party 
violated treaty law by diverting waterfalls and constructing water 
management infrastructure.56  The court concluded that both parties could 
build as many canals as they wanted, so long as the inflow and outflow from 
the river stayed unchanged and their actions remained aligned with the 
principles laid down in the treaty.57 
All the aforementioned cases required juridical resolution of the 
navigability of international watercourses.  Three cases required PCIJ to 
interpret mutually agreed treaties among co-riparian states to resolve water 
disputes.58 
 
 
                                                 
49 See Di Meuse, supra note 47; Dispute, supra note 47; Pulp Mills, supra note 47. 
50 Danube, supra note 35.  
51 River Order, supra note 35. 
52 Id.  
53 Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. Belg.), Judgement, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63 (Dec. 12).   
54 Meuse, supra note 47, at 5. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 46.  
57 Id. at 18.   
58 See LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, FRESH WATER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 204–09 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2015) (2013); WEISS, supra note 14, at 128–56. 
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1.1.2. International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
 
Later, the ICJ took charge of providing a mechanism to settle international 
conflicts, and it also adjudicated in water conflicts between states.59  In 1997, 
the ICJ ruled on the water conflict against the project of Gabcikovo 
Nagymoros by interpreting the 1977 treaty between Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia.60  Both states agreed to construct a joint project to manage 
waters and produce hydropower. 61   Owing to internal pressure, Hungary 
declined to continue any works, and Czechoslovakia separately commenced 
its works to divert Danube river water flows under the project Variant C, 
against the interests of Hungary, and started to build two water management 
and hydropower production projects on the same waters.62  Subsequently, in 
1977 Hungary sent notification of the termination of the 1977 treaty to 
Czechoslovakia.63  To resolve the water conflict, both states agreed to a new 
agreement in 1993, under which both states agreed to submit their issue to the 
authority of the ICJ to resolve their conflict.64  In 1997, the ICJ ruled that, 
while Hungary had notified of the termination of the 1977 treaty, it remained 
in force, and Czechoslovakia was not entitled to operate the Variant C 
project.65 
Similarly, in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case in 1999 the ICJ adjudicated 
on the navigability of water flows.66  In this case, the ICJ was required to 
interpret the boundaries prescribed within the bilaterally agreed treaty 
between Botswana and Namibia.67  Likewise, in 2002 the ICJ ruled over the 
boundary demarcation in a bilateral agreement, in the case of Cameroon v. 
Nigeria. 68   In Benin v. Niger, the ICJ was asked in 1999 to demarcate 
                                                 
59 CHAZOURNES, supra note 58. 
60 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 140, ¶ 67 (Sept. 25) 
[hereinafter Gabcikovo-Nagymaros]. 
61 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note 60, at 23.   
62 Id. at 25.  
63 Id. at 27. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 239.  
66 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. V. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045, 1184, ¶ 91 (Dec. 13) 
[hereinafter Kasikili]. 
67 Kasikili, supra note 67, at 1045.  
68 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), Order, 2002 
I.C.J. Rep. 303, 303, ¶ 1 (Oct. 10). 
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boundaries across the river waters of the Niger and Mekrou Rivers and the 
control of twenty-five islands between Benin and Niger.69 
Later, in 2011, ICJ settled the water dispute between Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua over the water pollution derangement of the San Juan river 
waters.70  The Court ruled that both states must refrain from aggravating the 
conflict, and both states could only send their civilian personnel to protect the 
environment.71  Both nations had already experienced another case regarding 
the same river waters in the same court in 2005.72  In this case, Costa Rica 
claimed that Nicaragua had violated Article 4 of their 1858 treaty with respect 
to its navigation rights.73  The Court in this case ruled that it was Nicaragua’s 
obligation to notify Costa Rica and respect its customary right.74 
In 2010, the ICJ made an international ruling on the case of Argentina v. 
Uruguay, which is most commonly known as the Pulp Mills case.75  In this 
case, Argentina was concerned with water pollution by Uruguay in the waters 
of the Uruguay River, and it claimed that Uruguay had violated their 1975 
bilaterally agreement.76  The court in that case maintained that Uruguay had 
indeed violated its procedural obligation to notify Argentina of its works over 
river waters, and established a general rule of international law that it is 
mandatory for states to prepare environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
reports for projects before commencing work.77 
 
1.1.3. Arbitration 
 
Arbitration courts are also used to resolve water disputes between states, 
particularly because rulings through this forum are binding in nature.78  The 
nature of water conflicts referred to a court of arbitration or tribunal varies 
                                                 
69 Frontier Dispute, supra note 35, at 103, ¶ 17. 
70 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Order, 2011 
I.C.J. Rep. 6, 19, ¶ 55 (Mar. 8) [hereinafter Costa Rica v. Nicar. 2011]. 
71 Id. at 21, ¶ 62.  
72 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Order, 2005 I.C.J. (Nov. 
29) [hereinafter Costa Rica v. Nicar. 2005]. 
73 Id.   
74
 I.C.J., Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua): Overview of 
the Case, ICJ (Oct. 1, 2017), http://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/133. 
75 Pulp Mills, supra note 47. 
76 Id. at 25. 
77 Id. at 82.  
78 See CHAZOURNES, supra note 58, at 209–12. 
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from disputes over water navigation, diversion of watercourses, hydropower 
project legality, water management structures, and demarcation of boundaries 
to other similar water utilization disputes.79  Among all referred cases in the 
PCA, most concern the demarcation of boundaries in international rivers.80  
Other disputes are chiefly about lower riparian states’ concerns regarding 
upper riparian states’ diversion of water flows.81  Only one or two arbitrations 
addressed the legality of hydropower production structures or assessments of 
environmental protection concerning the environment, floods, and soil 
corrosion.82 
Set out below are details about these water disputation cases in arbitration. 
One case of water dispute was referred to a British Commissioner in 1872; it 
was a case between Afghanistan and Persia over the water flows of the 
Helmand River Delta.83  The same states were in dispute over the same waters 
again in 1905.84  Another arbitration over water conflicts was disputed in 1888 
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over the waters of the San Juan River.85  
Then, in 1893, Russia and Britain sought arbitration over the Kushk river 
waters.86  Other cases include Venezuela v. Germany, over the Faber River in 
1903;87 the Gut Dam case between Canada and the United States;88 the 1925 
Tacna Arica case between Chile and Peru;89 the 1945 Zarumilla River case 
between Ecuador and Peru;90 the 1957 Lake Lanoux case between Spain and 
France;91 the 1977 Beagle Channel case between Argentina and Chile;92 the 
                                                 
79 See CHAZOURNES, supra note 58. 
80 See Id.  
81 WEISS, supra note 14, at 133–34.  
82 See Id. at 134-35.  
83 Helmand River Delta (Afg. v. Persia), General Goldsmid Award, 1872 P.I.C.J (Aug. 19). 
84 Id.  
85 San Juan River (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), President Grover Cleveland Award, 1888 P.I.C.J (Mar. 22). 
86 Kushk River (Gr. Brit.v. Russ.), Anglo-Russian Comm. Award, 1893 P.I.C.J (Sept. 3).  
87 Faber (Ger. v. Venez.), Henry M. Duffield Award, 1903 P.I.C.J (Feb. 13).  
88 Gut Dam Arbitration (Can. v. U.S.), Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal (1968). 
89 Tacna-Arica (Chile v. Peru), President Calvin Coolidge Award, 1925 P.I.C.J (Mar. 4). 
 
90 Zarumilla River (Peru v. Ecuador), Chancellery of Braz. Award, 1945 P.I.C.J (July 14). 
91 Lake Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 24 I.L.R 101 (1957). 
92  See Rep. Int’l Arbiral Awards, Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle 
Channel, U.N. Doc. (1977), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf. 
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2004 case between the Netherlands and France; 93  and the Kishanganga 
project case between of India and Pakistan, 94 over Indus river waters.95 
 
1.2. Nonjuridical Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 
Nonjuridical dispute resolution methods are usually the first available 
recourses to placate international tensions.  This forum includes approaches 
such as diplomatic negotiations, mediation, fact-finding commissions, and 
other similar intermediary techniques; this preliminary stage is nonbinding in 
nature. 96   This subsection will generally examine nonjuridical dispute 
resolution techniques and procedures.  Within this scope, notions such as fact-
finding commissions, mediation, and negotiation as nonjuridical dispute 
resolution mechanisms will be set out briefly. 
 
1.2.1. Fact-Finding Commissions 
 
Fact-finding commissions are formed by mutual agreement through 
conventions and treaties to establish disputed facts and pacify disagreements 
over facts or questions, which if established would violate treaty or laws.97  
The commissions comprise neutral members, or commissioners, from each 
party state, and in some cases a chairman.98  These commissions are tasked to 
resolve water disputes at a preliminary stage by agreement.99  Thus, these 
commissions act as dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve water conflicts 
between nations. 100   International organizations and treaty agreements 
between nations routinely form these commissions to resolve their disputes.101  
                                                 
93 Rhine Chlorides Arbitration (Neth. v. Fr.), Case No. 2000-02 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004). 
94 Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pak. v. India), Case No. 2011-01 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013) 
[hereinafter Kishenganga]. 
95 CHAZOURNES, supra note 58, at 134–35. 
96 Id. at 209-12; see also WEISS, supra note 14, at 128. 
97 WEISS, supra note 14, at 135–36.  
98 Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS.: OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER 17-21 (2015), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf [hereinafter 
Commissions on Inquiry]. 
99 WEISS, supra note 14, at 135–136. 
100  Article 33, UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION: ONLINE USERS GUIDE, 
http://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/the-convention/part-vi-miscellaneous-provisions/article-
33-settlement-of-disputes/33-1-7-fact-finding-and-inquiry/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2017). 
101 WEISS, supra note 14, at 136-37.  
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For instance, the Bi-national International Joint Commission was formed to 
reconcile disputes between the United States and Canada through the 
Boundary Waters Treaty, 1909.102  In total, 51 disputes were referred to this 
commission regarding water disputes between the United States and 
Canada. 103   Similarly, the PIC was formed between India and Pakistan 
through the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.104  This commission comprises two 
commissioners, and India and Pakistan have one commissioner each on this 
commission. 105   Likewise, the United Nations Watercourses Convention 
(“UNWC”) also establishes a fact-finding commission to resolve disputes 
among parties.106  This commission comprises one commissioner from each 
party to the UNWC, with one neutral chairman.107 
 
1.2.2. Mediation 
 
Mediation is also used as a forum to resolve disputes between nations.108  
In this form of mechanism, a neutral person assumes responsibility for 
mediating or conciliating disputes between nations, upon the mutual 
agreement of the parties. 109   The scope of mediation is not restricted to 
establishing facts, but it can offer solutions regarding disputes where these 
proposed solutions are not necessarily binding in nature.110  The appointment 
of a neutral expert under the IWT is an example of a mediator to resolve water 
disputes between India and Pakistan.  Under the IWT, the appointment of a 
neutral expert is a forum of dispute resolution.111 
 
1.2.3. Negotiations 
 
The most general and most frequently used dispute resolution mechanism 
is through negotiations between conflicting states.112  Negotiations, bilateral 
                                                 
102 See generally Boundary Waters Treaty art. VIII, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448. 
103 WEISS, supra note 14, at 136. 
104 See generally Indus Water Treaty, supra note 29. 
105 See Indus Water Treaty art. VIII & IX, supra note 29. 
106 Convention, supra note 40. 
107 See generally Convention, supra note 40. 
108 WEISS, supra note 14, at 139-42. 
109 Id.  
110 See Id.  
111 Indus Water Treaty art. IX, annexure F, supra note 29. 
112 See WEISS, supra note 14, at 142. 
15
Qureshi: Dispute Resolution Mechanisms:  An Analysis of the Indus Waters T
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2018
[Vol. 18: 75, 2018] Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
90 
 
talks, and diplomatic negotiations are employed by all countries to resolve 
their conflicts in a peaceful and cost-effective manner through mutual 
agreement.113  
Various conventions and treaties have made it obligatory for conflicting 
states to first exhaust the dispute resolution mechanism of negotiations before 
resorting to other forums of the dispute resolution framework.  For instance, 
Article 33 of the UNWC makes it obligatory for parties to resort to 
negotiations if one party wishes to solve the conflict through bilateral talks, 
only if conflicting states have not already agreed to resolve their issue by other 
means of the dispute resolution mechanism.114  Likewise, Article IX of the 
IWT makes it obligatory to exhaust the forum of negotiations as a dispute 
resolution mechanism to resolve a conflict through mutual agreement before 
resorting to the Court of Arbitration or a neutral expert.115 
 
2. Dispute Resolution Mechanism in International River Basins 
 
There are nearly 100 water conflicts over water apportionment, water 
utilization, water navigation, and water management of international river 
basins shared by two or more co-riparian states.116  Generally, lower riparian 
states are keen to safeguard their water rights from water poaching by upper 
riparian states.117  However, for the scope of this section, only the governing 
laws and agreements of certain international river basins will be explored to 
determine existing dispute resolution mechanisms in certain international 
rivers basins.  Stephen McCafferey has noted that international water basins 
and their water disputes can be categorized into three types of sceneries.118  
These settings include: (a) water disputes, where there is no mutual agreement 
between nations to share international watercourses; (b) circumstances where 
there is a mutually agreed treaty; and (c) situations where there is an agreed 
treaty among co-riparian states, but it is not functional in the current setting.119 
                                                 
113 CHAZOURNES, supra note 58, at 216-17. 
114 Convention, supra note 40, at 713-14.  
115 Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 150-52.  
116 See WEISS, supra note 14, at 121–22. 
117 ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 22, at 198. 
118 Stephen C. McCaffrey, Water Disputes Defined: Characteristics and Trends for Resolving Them, 
in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 49, 53 (The Int’l Bureau of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration ed., 2003). 
119 McCaffrey, supra note 118, at 53. 
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By analyzing current political relations among states, McCaffrey has 
categorized several river basins into these classes.120  Through this analysis of 
classification, the governing dispute resolution mechanism is determined.121  
This section of the paper comprises three subsections.  Section 2.1 will 
analyze the international water basin of the Euphrates.  Section 2.2 will 
scrutinize the international river basins of the Nile, the Jordan, and other 
international basins of considerable size and global effect.  Section 2.3 will 
explore the Indus River Basin. 
 
2.1. Euphrates River Basin 
 
Stephen McCaffrey’s categories can be used to see the current status of 
international river basins.  For instance, in the river basin of the Euphrates, it 
can be seen that there are several treaties that describe the legal framework of 
this basin, but there is no multilateral, holistic treaty that governs the 
principles of water apportionment in the basin among all co-riparian states.122  
Furthermore, he adds, owing to the Turkish hegemonic race to capture water 
supplies and given the uncertain security situation in lower riparian states, 
such as Syria and Iraq, water apportionment cooperation is unlikely.123 
 
2.2. Jordan, Nile, and Other River Basins 
 
Similarly, McCaffrey has noted the status of other river basins with regard 
to their governing legal framework.124  The international watercourse basin of 
the Nile and Jordan Rivers, sharing watercourses with Lebanon, Israel, 
Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, are seen as international river 
basins with no holistic legal framework for water apportionment.125  Several 
bilaterally agreed treaties have narrowed down the scope of water sharing in 
these regions and basins.126 
Relatedly, he notes that in the international river basins of the Amudarya, 
the Danube, the Rhine, the Rio Grande, and the Syrdarya, the existing legal 
framework is no longer functional.  He adds that the international river basins 
                                                 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 See Id. at 54–55. 
123 See Id. 
124 See Id. at 52.  
125 See Id. at 55-60. 
126 See Id. 
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of the Flathead, the Ganges, the Mekong, the Skagit, and the Indus Rivers 
have functional legal frameworks.127 
 
2.3. Indus River Basin 
 
 The Indus River Basin is shared primarily by India and Pakistan.128  
India is an upper riparian state to Pakistan.129  Both countries have agreed to 
the IWT,130 which is still functional after more than half a century.131  The 
IWT is considered a landmark success story in the field of water-sharing 
agreements across the globe, as both hostile nations agreed to equitably 
resolve their water disputes, and the treaty has survived several wars between 
the states.132 
 Since India and Pakistan’s independence in 1947, both states have 
fought over the occupied territories of Kashmir to gain control of water 
supplies, which are strategically valuable. 133   Even in recent times, both 
countries have faced constant threats from each side over several separate 
issues.134  Many water conflicts are disputes relating to Indian infrastructure 
on the western tributaries.135  The western rivers were allocated, under the 
IWT, for the unrestricted use of Pakistan, while the eastern rivers were 
allocated for the unrestricted use of India.136  Pakistan is of the view that India 
is robbing Pakistani supplies and building its water-management capacity 
only as a political maneuver to gain political supremacy by practicing hydro-
hegemony.137  On the other hand, India maintains that it is only constructing 
infrastructure within the scope of the IWT, and the decreased water flows in 
                                                 
127 See Id. at 74–84.  
128 Afghanistan and China also share the Indus Basin with Pakistan and India, however they share a 
relatively smaller geographical area.  See ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 22, at 6.  
129 See ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 22, at 198. 
130 Indus Water Treaty, supra note 29 
131 See McCaffrey, supra note 115, at 78–80. 
132 BRAHMA CHELLANEY, WATER: ASIA’S NEW BATTLEGROUND 278 (Geo. Univ. Press 2013). 
133 KALIA, supra note 20, at 8. 
134 See generally SHAH, supra note 21. 
135 See generally ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 22. 
136 See Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 130-36. 
137 See generally Iqbal, supra note 23. 
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Pakistan are due to climate change.138  Therefore, water disputes are routinely 
referred to the legal mechanism prescribed in the IWT.139 
For these reasons, both states are still facing certain challenges.  Within 
the parameters prescribed in the IWT, India believes that Pakistan has no basis 
to object to its construction works, obtain stay orders, and delay the 
construction works.140  And, through these delays in construction works the 
actual and opportunity costs of projects are borne by the Indian state, which 
is injuring Indian interests and economy. 141   On the other side, Pakistan 
maintains that the dispute-resolution mechanism is very slow, and by the time 
the case reaches the highest forum either the project has been completed, or it 
has incurred so much cost that it cannot be held back.142  And, even if the 
court sides with Pakistan, all it does is make slight changes to a few designs 
of Indian projects.143 
The Indian state is exasperated with Pakistan’s frequent objections and 
feels that the IWT is an impediment to its interests.144  Therefore, India has 
threatened that it will scrap the IWT entirely.145  In response, Pakistan has 
stated that a revocation of a bilaterally-agreed treaty would be considered an 
act of war.146  To communicate state interests with regard to water disputes, 
the PIC has been tasked with communicating with each state. 147   This 
extraordinary intensity in political rigidity between Pakistan and India has an 
enshrined legal framework to alleviate water disputes.148  The IWT is an anvil 
to mold sustainability in the region, where both states know that other water 
is intrinsic, and therefore the other party will not let go of its legal and innate 
rights.149 
                                                 
138 PARENTI, supra note 24, at 129. 
139 See Kishenganga, supra note 94.  
140 See generally Rizwan Ullah Kokab & Adnan Nawaz, Indus Water Treaty: Need for Review, 2 
ASIAN J. OF SOC. SCI. & HUMAN (2013). 
141 Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213–14 (2013), see also MUHAMMAD ADEEL, INDUS WATER 
TREATY AND THE CASE FOR HYDRO-HEGEMONY 4 (2016); Iqbal, supra note 23. 
142 Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 212-13. 
143 See ADEEL & WIRSING, supra note 22, at 4; see also Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213–14; 
Kishenganga, supra note 94.  
144 Chandio, supra note 27. 
145 Id.  See also VERMA, supra note 27; Aziz, supra note 27. 
146 Aziz, supra note 27. 
147 Id.  See also Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29.  
148 Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29.  
149 See McCaffrey, supra note 115, at 78–80. 
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This paper seeks to explore the legal framework of dispute resolution 
under the IWT, and further investigates the weaknesses and strengths of the 
prescribed mechanism.  To maintain impartiality, the concerns of both nations 
with regard to flaws in the dispute resolution mechanism of the IWT will be 
explored and weighed in the equation of exploring the suitability of the IWT 
legal framework.  Furthermore, to evaluate equitableness and to assess 
contemporary apparatuses, the IWT dispute resolution mechanism’s ability to 
keep up with emerging modern issues will be briefly compared with 
international law and other similar treaties. 
 
3. The Dispute Resolution Mechanism of the IWT  
 
This section will explore the multilayered dispute resolution mechanism 
under the IWT.  This section comprises five subsections.  Section 3.1 will 
explore the first available forum for dispute resolution under the IWT.  Here, 
issues are questions of fact that are determined by the PIC.  Section 3.2 will 
set out the second forum of dispute resolution under the IWT.  At this stage 
of dispute resolution, differences between India and Pakistan over water 
conflicts are to be solved through a neutral expert.  Section 3.3 will examine 
the third stage of the dispute resolution mechanism under the IWT.  At this 
stage, India and Pakistan’s water dispute is to be resolved through diplomatic 
talks and bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan.  Section 3.4 will 
briefly explore the Court of Arbitration as a last resort to settle a dispute 
between India and Pakistan under the dispute resolution mechanism of the 
IWT.  Finally, Section 3.5 will define the dispute resolution mechanism 
comprehensively, to conclude this section. 
Holistically, the dispute resolution mechanism of the IWT is enshrined 
under Article IX of the IWT, which prescribes a multilayered dispute 
resolution mechanism to resolve water conflicts between India and 
Pakistan.150 
 
3.1. Stage One: The Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) 
 
Article IX(1) of the IWT reads as follows: “Any question which arises 
between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty 
or the existence of any fact which, if established, might constitute a breach of 
this Treaty shall first be examined by the Commission, which will endeavor 
                                                 
150 Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, art. IX, at 150–52.  
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to resolve the question by agreement.”151  At stage one, if any question is 
raised by either party regarding the interpretation of the IWT or any fact that, 
if established, may violate the IWT, then this question will be dealt with by 
the PIC. 152   At this stage, the PIC will try to resolve the question by 
agreement.153 
The PIC is formed by and derives its powers and obligations from Article 
VIII of the IWT.154  Under this provision, Pakistan and India each nominate a 
highly qualified engineer in the area of hydrology and water utilization as a 
commissioner.155  Both commissioners are representatives of their respective 
governments and are responsible for meeting obligations under Article VIII 
of the IWT.156  For example, all communication regarding the IWT should be 
managed through the commissioner.157  These commissioners are responsible 
for exchanging relevant data, notices, and other duties assigned by their 
states.158  Together, both commissioners form the PIC.159  This commission is 
responsible for settling any raised question of interpretation or fact that, if 
established, might violate a provision of the IWT.160  Furthermore, either 
commissioner can request the other to inspect the relevant rivers and its 
projects.161  They are obliged under the IWT to conduct a meeting together at 
least once a year, and are given certain immunities to be able to work 
effectively.162  Furthermore, each commissioner is obliged to submit their 
report to their respective government annually, and also can submit timely 
reports with regard to their own assessment.163  In addition, the commissioners 
themselves determine all of their procedures.164 
                                                 
151 Indus Waters Treaty art. IX(1), supra note 29, at 150.  
152 Id.  
153 Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII, supra note 29, at 146. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id.  
159 Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII(1)(b)(3), supra note 29, at 146. 
160 Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII, supra note 29, at 148. 
161 Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII(1)(b)(4), supra note 29, at 148. 
162 Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII(1)(b)(5), supra note 29, at 148.  
163 Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII(1)(b)(8), supra note 29, at 150 
164 Indus Waters Treaty art. VIII(1)(b)(10), supra note 29, at 150. 
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If the question is not resolved by the first available forum of the PIC, then 
the question will be solved through the higher forum of stage two.165 
 
3.2. Stage Two: Neutral Expert 
 
For the second stage, Article IX(2) of the IWT reads as follows: 
If the Commission does not reach agreement on any of the questions 
mentioned in Paragraph (1), then a difference will be deemed to have arisen, 
which shall be dealt with as follows: (a) Any difference which, in the opinion 
of either Commissioner, falls within the provisions of Part I of Annexure F 
shall, at the request of either Commissioner, be dealt with by a Neutral Expert 
in accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of Annexure F.166 
Under this provision, if the PIC does not resolve the question of fact that 
may have constituted a breach of the IWT, and the PIC has failed to reach an 
agreement, then a “difference” has arisen between India and Pakistan.  At this 
stage, the difference is to be solved through a neutral expert.167 
When a difference has arisen, upon the notification of any commissioner 
from the PIC a highly qualified engineer is to be appointed as a neutral expert 
within a month, by the mutual agreement of both governments of India and 
Pakistan.168  If the governments fail to agree on the appointment of a neutral 
expert, then it is the responsibility of the World Bank to appoint a neutral 
expert.169  Furthermore, the term of appointment of the neutral expert is also 
fixed.170  During the transition period, the World Bank will appoint the neutral 
expert, and following this period, both governments will appoint a new neutral 
expert together. 171   When a difference has arisen, after two weeks a 
commissioner will notify the relevant authority to appoint a neutral expert, 
and send a copy to the other commissioner.172  The neutral expert can only 
determine any procedure to solve difference after hearing both sides, 
                                                 
165 Indus Waters Treaty art. IX(2), supra note 29, at 150. 
166 Id. 
167 Id.  
168 Indus Waters Treaty art. IX(5), supra note 29, at 152. 
169 Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 150, 202.  
170 Indus Waters Treaty Annexure F, supra note 29, at 206. 
171 Indus Waters Treaty Annexure F(4), supra note 29, at 206.  
172 Indus Waters Treaty Annexure F(5), supra note 29, at 206. 
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adequately. 173   Furthermore, the issue of financial compensation for the 
neutral is enumerated to avoid prejudice.174 
The Neutral Expert is employed to determine whether part of the 
difference, no part of the difference, or all-inclusive differences fall within the 
category of the dispute.175  The decision of a Neutral Expert is binding in 
nature; it is even binding on the Court of Arbitration.176  However, if any 
conflicting issue is out of the scope of competency of the Neutral Expert, it 
will be dealt with at the later stages of dispute resolution mechanism under 
the IWT.177 
In other words, if the neutral expert fails to resolve the difference, then 
the conflict will reach the third available forum to resolve the issue.178 
 
3.3. Stage Three: Negotiations 
 
For the third stage, Article IX(2)(b) of the IWT reads as follows: 
If the difference does not come within the provisions of Paragraph (2) (a), 
or if a Neutral Expert, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 7 of 
Annexure F, has informed the Commission that, in his opinion, the difference, 
or a part thereof, should be treated as a dispute, then a dispute will be deemed 
to have arisen which shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of 
Paragraphs (3), (4)[,] and (5)[] [p]rovided that, at the discretion of the 
Commission, any difference may either be dealt with by a Neutral Expert in 
accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of Annexure F or be deemed to be a 
dispute to be settled in accordance with the provisions of Paragraphs (3), (4) 
and (5), or may be settled in any other way agreed upon by the Commission.179 
At this third stage, the difference has not yet resolved and the Neutral 
Expert communicates to the PIC that a “dispute” has arisen between India and 
Pakistan.180  However, it is pertinent to note that, at this stage, it is the PIC’s 
discretion to choose whether the conflict is resolved through a Neutral Expert, 
                                                 
173 Indus Waters Treaty Annexure F, supra note 29, at 206. 
174 Id. at 208–10. 
175 Id. at 202. 
176 Id. at 208.  
177 Id.  
178 See generally Indus Water Treaty art. IX, supra note 29. 
179 Indus Water Treaty art. IX(2)(b), supra note 29, at 150. 
180 Indus Water Treaty art. IX, supra note 29. 
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by bilateral diplomatic talks, or through arbitration.181  Article IX(3) and (4) 
of the IWT reads as follows: 
As soon as a dispute to be settled in accordance with this and the 
succeeding paragraphs of this Article has arisen, the Commission shall, at the 
request of either Commissioner, report the fact to the two Governments, as 
early as practicable, stating in its report the points on which the Commission 
is in agreement and the issues in dispute, the views of each Commissioner on 
these issues and his reasons therefor. 
[] Either Government may, following receipt of the report referred to in 
Paragraph (3), or if it comes to the conclusion that this report is being unduly 
delayed in the Commission, invite the other Government to resolve the dispute 
by agreement.  In doing so it shall state the names of its negotiators and their 
readiness to meet with the negotiators to be appointed by the other 
Government at a time and place to be indicated by the other Government.  To 
assist in these negotiations, the two Governments may agree to enlist the 
services of one or more mediators acceptable to them.182 
Thus, as soon as the PIC has received notification of a dispute, it is then 
the duty of the commissioners of the PIC to communicate to both governments 
about the agreements of the issue, if any, and to report the dispute that has 
arisen, coupled with the reasoning of each commissioner.183  At this stage, the 
forum to resolve the dispute is through governmental “diplomatic 
negotiations.”184  To obtain resolution through negotiations, each government 
can appoint negotiators and fix a date and time to proceed with bilateral 
talks.185  To provide further support for these bilateral talks, both states can 
use mediation to reconcile water disputes, and can appoint mediators through 
mutual agreement.186 
 
3.4. Stage Four: Arbitration 
 
If the dispute is not resolved through mediation or negotiations by 
diplomatic talks, then the dispute can be referred for arbitration.187  Article 
IX(5) and(6) of the IWT reads as follows: 
                                                 
181 See generally, Id.  
182 Indus Water Treaty art. IX(3)-(4), supra note 29, at 150-52. 
183 Indus Water Treaty arts. VIII & IX, supra note 29. 
184 Indus Water Treaty art. IX, supra note 29. 
185 Indus Waters Treaty art. IX(4), supra note 29, at 152. 
186 See generally Id. 
187 Indus Waters Treaty art. IX, supra note 29. 
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5) A court of Arbitration shall be established to resolve the dispute in the 
manner provided by Annexure G 
a) upon agreement between the Parties to do so; or  
b) at the request of either Party, if, after negotiations have begun pursuant 
to Paragraph (4), in its opinion the dispute is not likely to be resolved by 
negotiation or mediation; or 
c) at the request of either Party, if, after the expiry of one month following 
receipt by the other Government of the invitation referred to in Paragraph (4). 
that Party comes to the conclusion that the other Government is unduly 
delaying the negotiations. 
6) The provisions of Paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) shall not apply to any 
difference while it is being dealt with by a Neutral Expert.188 
Under this provision, both parties can refer the water dispute for 
arbitration if the negotiations or mediation have failed to resolve the water 
conflict.189  Even at the request of one party, a dispute can be referred for 
arbitration if the negotiations have failed to resolve the dispute.190  More 
specifically, the case can be referred for arbitration where one party after the 
completion of a one-month notification considers that the negotiations 
between the parties have been unduly delayed.191 
When under Article IX, a need for a Court of Arbitration (“CoA”) arises, 
and both states must carry out a special agreement to establish it and lay down 
its procedures and its composition at the request of either party.192  If the 
parties do not agree to the composition of the CoA, then the CoA will 
comprise of seven members.193  Each state appoints two arbitrators, and the 
remaining three arbitrators will be umpires appointed by a lengthy procedure 
provided in Annexure G of the Indus Water Treaty that requires a panel or 
governmental agreement of both parties.194  Any decision reached by the court 
majority will be held binding on both parties regarding the resolution of the 
referred dispute.195  To reach this decision, unless otherwise agreed by both 
                                                 
188 Indus Waters Treaty art. IX(5)-(6), supra note 29, at 152. 
189 Indus Waters Treaty art. IX(5), supra note 29, at 152. 
190 Id.  
191 Indus Waters Treaty art. IX(5)(c), supra note 29, at 152 
192 Indus Waters Treaty Annexure G(2)(a), supra note 29, at 210. 
193 Indus Waters Treaty Annexure G(4), supra note 29, at 212. 
194 See Indus Waters Treaty Annexure G(4)-(7), supra note 29, at 212-14. 
195 Indus Waters Treaty Annexure G, supra note 29. 
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parties, the CoA can rely on the IWT, the international convention to which 
both India and Pakistan are parties and customary international law.196 
 
3.5. Reflection 
 
To conclude, the mechanism of dispute resolution in the IWT involves 
several stages, including a permanent commission, the Neutral Expert, 
diplomatic negotiations, and international arbitration.  Basically, the IWT has 
a four-layer dispute resolution mechanism, where each layer encompasses a 
forum to settle the dispute peacefully.197  At the first stage, a permanent 
commission under the IWT resolves any question of fact that if established 
could violate the provisions of the IWT.198  The difference of interests and 
objections of a party are termed as a “question” in the first stage, which is to 
be resolved by the PIC.199  If the commission fails to resolve the question 
raised, then a “difference” has arisen and the parties are in the second issue 
resolution forum; the “difference” between India and Pakistan under the IWT 
is resolved by mediation, through a neutral expert, which is the second forum 
to resolve an issue.  In the third stage, if the neutral expert fails to resolve the 
“difference,” then a “dispute” has arisen between these two states, which must 
be resolved by diplomatic negotiations between both parties, by mediation, or 
by the CA at the discretion of the commission.200  This means that, if the 
dispute is not resolved by governmental negotiations or mediation, the fourth 
and last stage in the dispute resolution mechanism under the IWT is to resolve 
a water dispute between India and Pakistan through the CA.201  Stage four is 
the highest available forum under the IWT to resolve water conflicts between 
India and Pakistan.202  The CA can rely on the IWT, international conventions 
to which both India and Pakistan are parties, and customary international 
law.203 
Furthermore, the immersion of international law in the CA makes it a 
platform that encompasses emerging issues, while accommodating 
                                                 
196 Indus Waters Treaty Annexure G(29), supra note 29, at 220. 
197 See generally Indus Waters Treaty art. IX, supra note 29. 
198 Indus Waters Treaty art. IX(1), supra note 29, at 150. 
199 Id.  
200 Indus Waters Treaty art. XI, supra note 29. 
201 Id.  
202 Indus Waters Treaty art. IX(5), supra note 29. 
203 See Indus Waters Treaty Annexure (G), supra note 29. 
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developing water apportionment principles and rules.  For instance, in the 
Kishenganga case, the PCA relied on the case law of the Pulp Mills case.204 
Furthermore, the multilayered dispute resolution mechanism of the IWT 
is in congruity with international laws and universally acclaimed rules.  For 
example, Article 33 of the UNWC also allows parties to use several stages of 
forums to resolve their disputes.  Article 33 of the UNWC offers a range of 
dispute resolution mechanisms, which involves bilateral agreements, 
negotiations, mediation, conciliation, and obligatory fact-finding joint 
commissions.205  However, both India and Pakistan have reservations about 
the UNWC, most specifically with the binding and compulsory nature of 
Article 33.206 
The multilayered dispute resolution under the IWT is a reflection of 
acceptable forums and techniques of international law and globally practiced 
customs.  Examples of these techniques and customs under the IWT include: 
the role of a neutral expert for mediation, the obligation of the PIC as a 
permanent joint fact-finding commission, the involvement of mediation and 
negotiations as diplomatic negotiations and mediation, and the establishment 
of the CA;207  all are widely used dispute resolution mechanisms to placate 
water conflicts around the world. 
It is pertinent to note that the dispute resolution mechanism under the IWT 
employs undertakes both juridical and non-juridical techniques to settle 
differences and disputes between India and Pakistan.  By allowing a four-layer 
legal dispute resolution framework, the IWT encompasses almost all binding 
and nonbinding legal procedures to settle water conflicts,208 except for the 
dispute resolution forum of the ICJ because the IWT deliberately does not 
accommodate the ICJ as a legal forum to settle disputes.  Apart from this, the 
IWT gives substantial consideration to bilateral agreements and diplomatic 
negotiations as nonbinding forums to settle disputes,209 and affords arbitration 
and neutral experts binding authority in settling disputes.210 
                                                 
204 See Kishenganga, supra note 94. 
205 Convention, supra note 40. 
206 Hamid Sarfaraz, Revisiting the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, 38:2 WATER INT’L 204, 211 (2013). 
207 Indus Waters Treaty art. IX, supra note 29. 
208 Article IX of the IWT offers dispute resolution mechanism through arbitration, a neutral expert, 
negotiation and the Commission.  Indus Waters Treaty art. XI, supra note 29.  In this equation, 
arbitration and neutral expert decisions are binding within the scope of the IWT, and resolutions of 
negotiations and the Commission as dispute resolution mechanisms are nonbinding in nature.  Id. 
209 Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at art. VII, IX. 
210 Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at art. IX, and Annexures D, E. 
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4. Efficacy of the IWT Dispute Resolution Mechanism211 
 
India and Pakistan have routinely maintained that the IWT dispute 
resolution mechanism is an impediment to justice.212  On the one hand, India 
argues that Pakistan’s frequent objections to every Indian project raise the 
costs of these projects, by delaying their construction processes.213  On the 
other hand, Pakistan maintains that India does not inform Pakistan of the 
commencement of Indian hydraulic construction projects on the western 
waters, which is in violation of IWT.214  Pakistan adds that, whenever an issue 
has been raised in dispute resolution forums under the IWT, India has 
repeatedly pressed Pakistan toward bilateral talks, as a delaying tactic to 
complete its construction works of projects, so that major issues remain 
unresolved after the completion of a project. 215   This is mainly because 
adjudications tend to hold back the raised issues if the project has incurred so 
much cost or is completed.216 
For these reasons, this section explores the efficacy of the dispute 
resolution mechanism under the IWT.  Consequently, time spent consumed at 
specific stages of the dispute resolution will be noted in the context of certain 
water conflicts over Indian projects on western waters.  This section has five 
subsections that will analyze the proficiency of the IWT dispute resolution 
mechanism during the water disputes between India and Pakistan.  Section 4.1 
deals with the Salal project, Section 4.2 with the Tulbul Navigation project, 
Section 4.3 with the Baglihar project, Section 4.4 with the Kishenganga 
project, and Section 4.5 with the Chutak project. 
 
                                                 
211 See Asif Baig Mirza, Performances of Dispute Resolution Mechanism of the Indus Waters Treaty, 
PILDAT, (Sept. 2013) 
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP/PerformanceofDisputeResolutionMechanismofthe
IndusWatersTreaty_BackgroundPaper.pdf. 
212 Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213-14; see also Iqbal, supra note 23, at 110. 
213 Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213–14. 
214 Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at art. IX, Annexure D at ¶ 9, and Annexure E at ¶ 12.  India 
is obliged to inform Pakistan of the commencement of any construction works over the western waters 
at least six months before any works starts.  Id. 
215  Indus Water Dispute Going to Arbitration Again, THE THIRD POLE (July 18, 2016). 
https://www.thethirdpole.net/2016/07/18/indus-water-dispute-going-to-arbitrators-again/ [hereinafter 
The Third Pole]. 
216 See Kishenganga, supra note 94.  
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4.1. Salal Dam Project 
 
Under the IWT, Pakistan raised its first objection to an Indian project in 
July 1970,217 after the design of the Salal hydropower production project was 
shared with Pakistan in April 1970.218   This project was planned for the 
Chenab River,219 which is a western river.220  Western rivers are allocated for 
the unrestricted use of Pakistan.221  The Pakistani issues were not resolved 
through the PIC.  In 1974, the PIC communicated its incapability to resolve 
the matter.  The conflict “was taken to the governmental level in 1975,” and 
through bilateral diplomatic talks of negotiations between India and Pakistan 
the issue was resolved in 1978, when India agreed to make the necessary 
changes in the design of the Salal project.222  It is interesting to note that the 
dispute resolution mechanism in its very first case took eight years, 1970–
1978, to resolve the conflict. 
 
4.2. Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage 
 
The Tulbul Navigation project—Pakistan prefers to refer to it as the 
Wullar Barrage—was designed over the western Jhelum River and was the 
subject of Pakistan’s second reservation.223  Under the IWT, India is obliged 
to inform Pakistan of any construction work over the western waters. 224  
However, India commenced its construction of the Tulbul Navigation Project 
in 1984 without sharing its designs or plans and without even informing 
Pakistan of the commencement of any construction works.225  The relevant 
reports were shared with Pakistan in 1986, after governmental pressure.226  
                                                 
217 MOONIS AHMAR, THE CHALLENGE OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN SOUTH ASIA 396 
(2001). 
218 AHMAR, supra note 217, at 396. 
219 Id.  
220 Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at art. III. 
221 Id.  
222 Mirza, supra note 211, at 14. 
223 RAJPAL BUDANIA, INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY DILEMMA: THE PAKISTAN FACTOR & INDIA’S 
POLICY RESPONSE 185 (Indus Pub., 2001). 
224 Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at art. VII and annexures D and E. 
225 Ashok Swain, Water Insecurity in the Indus Basin: The Costs of Noncooperation, in IMAGINING 
INDUSTAN: OVERCOMING WATER INSECURITY IN THE INDUS BASIN 37, 40 (Zafar Adeel & Reobert 
Wirsing eds., 2016). 
226 See Mirza, supra note 211, at 14. 
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Temporarily, India stayed its construction works on this project in 1987.227  
However, sources believe that India has resumed its construction works, and 
the works at this site are proceeding at full pace.228  The PIC failed to resolve 
this issue and the negotiation between the two states over this project has 
consumed more than 16 rounds of bilateral talks.229  Pakistan has maintained 
that commencement of this project without informing Pakistan is a direct 
violation of the IWT230 and adds that the project will decrease water flows of 
the Jhelum River in Kharif season, when water is needed most, and exceeds 
the storage capacity allowed under the IWT.231  To this date, the water conflict 
over this project between India and Pakistan remains unresolved by the 
dispute resolution mechanism, which has now consumed a good 32 years.232 
 
4.3. Baglihar Dam Project 
 
The designs of this project were shared with Pakistan in 1992, and 
Pakistan raised its objections to this project in the same year.233  The PIC took 
12 years and in 2004 concluded that it could not resolve this dispute.234  Then, 
at a later stage, governmental negotiations and diplomatic bilateral talks after 
two rounds of talks also failed and decided to pursue the matter at a later stage 
through a neutral expert in 2005.235  Within two more years, the neutral expert 
gave its conclusion, and the issue was resolved in 2007.236  It is interesting to 
note here that the neutral expert did allow certain changes in the design of the 
Baglihar Dam but went against the explicit provisioned assertions of the 
                                                 
227 Swain, supra note 225, at 41. 
228 India Rejects Pakistan Objections, Work on Tulbul Navigation Project in Full Swing, NORTHLINES, 
Oct. 7, 2016. 
229 Mirza, supra note 211, at 15. 
230 Epilogue Press, 3(11) EPILOGUE, 35 (2009); see also, RONGXING GUO, TERRITORIAL DISPUTES & 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, 143 (Nova Pub., 2006); Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at art. I para. 
11, art. III para. 4, and art. VIII para. H.  
231 Mirza, supra note 211, at 15. 
232 See Id. at 14–15.  
233 Id. at 15. 
234 Id. 
235 ROBERT G. WIRSING, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OVER WATER RESOURCES IN HIMALAYAN 
ASIA 98 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
236 Kanti Bajpal, India’s Regional Disputes, in SHAPING THE EMERGING WORLD: INDIA AND THE 
MULTILATERAL ORDER 115, 120 (Waheguru Pal Sing Sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta & Bruce Jones eds. 
2013). 
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IWT.237  For instance, the neutral expert maintained that through the Baglihar 
Dam India could maintain a water level below the dead storage level for the 
maintenance of the project,238 whereas the IWT explicitly states that “dead 
storage shall not be depleted except in an unforeseen emergency.  If so, it will 
be refilled in accordance of the conditions of its initial fillings.”239 
Experts such as IWT commissioners have noted that by repeatedly 
pressing Pakistan toward bilateral talks, India has used delaying tactics to 
complete the construction works of its projects so that major issues remain 
redundant after the completion of the project.240   This is mainly because 
adjudications tend to hold back the raised issues if the project has incurred so 
much cost or has been completed.241  The dispute resolution mechanism of the 
IWT took 15 years to resolve this issue, and still an interpretation of a major 
clause remained unresolved. 
 
4.4. Kishanganga Dam Project 
 
  In the case of the Kishanganga Dam, India again did not inform 
Pakistan of the commencement of construction works, nor did it share any 
designs or planning.  Pakistan objected to this project in 1988,242 while India 
formally shared its relevant information in 1994. 243   India successfully 
transformed this project’s purpose from a storage facility to a run-of-the-river 
power production unit in 2006.244  In 2010, Pakistan determined that the PIC 
had been unsuccessful in resolving tensions over this project.245  The case was 
referred to the PCoA, which took between two and three years to conclude the 
case.246   The dispute resolution mechanism of the IWT took 19 years to 
resolve this case.247  Pakistan still has pending objections to this project, and 
the World Bank to this date is currently deciding between Indian demands to 
                                                 
237 See WIRSING, ET AL., supra note 235, at 98. 
238 RAYMOND LAFITTE, BALIHAR HYDROELECTRIC PLANT: EXPERT DETERMINATION 13 (2007). 
239 Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at annexure E, para. 18. 
240 The Third Pole, supra note 215. 
241 See also Adeel, supra note 120, at 4; Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213-14; Kishangan supra 
note 94. 
242 Mirza, supra note 211, at 15.  
243 CHAZOURNES, supra note 58, at 417. 
244 Mirza, supra note 211, at 15. 
245 Mirza, supra note 211, at 15. 
246 Kishangangan, supra note 94. 
247 See Mirza, supra note 211, at 15. 
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install a neutral expert and Pakistan’s request to establish a CoA to resolve the 
water conflicts of India and Pakistan over the Kishanganga and Ratle 
projects.248 
 
4.5. Chutak Project 
 
Once again, in 2004 India started construction works on this project 
without informing Pakistan and without sharing its plan and designs.249  After 
frequent objections, India shared its information with Pakistan in 2007.250  
Through several PIC meetings, this issue was resolved in 2010. 251   The 
dispute resolution mechanism took less time to resolve this issue—only two 
years. 
It is noted through the discussion in this section that Pakistan is currently 
facing two major problems against the dispute resolution mechanism.  The 
first issue is that India commences its construction works without informing 
Pakistan, which delays the possibility to raise issues in a timely manner.  By 
the time Pakistan is formally informed of the design and plans of project on 
the western rivers, India has substantially completed its works and has 
incurred so much cost that the projects cannot be held back.252  This practice 
is against the obligation under the IWT,253 where India is obliged to share data 
regarding any planned works over the western rivers as soon as possible, 
which is noted as six months before any commencement of construction 
works under the IWT.254  The second issue is that the dispute resolution 
mechanism itself is a very slow legal framework under the IWT, which can 
take more than a decade to resolve an issue.  Experts have noted that these 
reasons delay justice, while delays in providing information on designs and 
plans from the Indian side adversely affect Pakistani interests and defeat the 
purpose of any dispute resolution mechanism.255 
 
                                                 
248 Mubarak Zeb Khan, India Asked to Stop Work on Kishanganga & Ratle Projects, DAWN (Jan. 21, 
2017), https://www.dawn.com/news/1309767. 
249 Mirza, supra note 211, at 15. 
250 Id. 
251 Id.  
252 Adeel, supra note 141, at 4; see also SHARAD JAIN ET AL., HYDROLOGY AND WATER RESOURCES 
OF INDIA 940 (2007); Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 13-14; Kishanganga, supra note 94. 
253 Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29.  
254 Id. 
255 Mirza, supra note 211. 
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5. Compliance with the Dispute Resolution Mechanism of the IWT 
 
To recommend the effective use of the dispute resolution mechanism 
under the IWT, this section analyzes Indian obligations under the IWT and 
explores Indian and Pakistani arguments that the dispute resolution 
mechanism is ineffective.  In order to build such a nexus, the inefficacy of the 
legal framework under the IWT, Indian obligations under the IWT and certain 
provisions of the IWT will be set out within this section.  Furthermore, brief 
recommendations to make the existing framework more effective at resolving 
disputes will be briefly proposed in this section. 
The IWT explicitly obliges India to communicate relevant information 
with Pakistan in a timely manner.256  Article VII(2) of the IWT reads as 
follows: 
If either Party plans to construct any engineering work which would cause 
interference with the waters of any of the Rivers and which, in its opinion, 
would affect the other Party materially, it shall notify the other Party of its 
plans and shall supply such data relating to the work as may be available and 
as would enable the other Party to inform itself of the nature, magnitude and 
effect of the work.  If a work would cause interference with the waters of any 
of the Rivers but would not, in the opinion of the Party planning it, affect the 
other Party materially, nevertheless the Party planning the work shall, on 
request, supply the other Party with such data regarding the nature, magnitude 
and effect, if any, of the work as may be available.257 
Similarly, Annexure D, Paragraph 9, of the IWT states as follows: 
To enable Pakistan to satisfy itself that the design of a Plant conforms to 
the criteria mentioned in Paragraph 8, India shall, at least six months in 
advance of the beginning of construction of river works connected with the 
Plant, communicate to Pakistan, in writing, the information specified in 
Appendix II to this Annexure.  If any such information is not available or is 
not pertinent to the design of the Plant or to the conditions at the site, it will 
be so stated.258 
Likewise, Annexure E, Paragraph 12, provides a similar statement 
regarding the construction works of storage facilities, which obliges India to 
share data at least six months before their commencement.259 
                                                 
256 Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at Annexure D.  
259 Id. at Annexure E.  
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As mandated under the IWT, if India does not violate this bilaterally 
agreed treaty and shares relevant information of designs and plans of 
construction works with Pakistan at least six months before their 
commencement, the dispute resolution mechanism can resolve water conflicts 
quickly between India and Pakistan260  Conversely, India deliberately starts 
construction works on the western rivers without informing Pakistan, so that 
Pakistan cannot raise timely objections, and when the objections reach the 
highest available forum the resolution cannot go against Indian interests since 
destruction of a project after its completion is never pursued, as hydro 
management power projects are built at very high prices.261 
On the other hand, India argues that Pakistan’s frequent objections to 
every Indian project raise the costs of these projects by delaying their 
construction processes. 262   However, this Indian concern can be easily 
resolved if the designs of Indian projects are shared in a timely manner with 
Pakistan, so that any difference or dispute is resolved even before the 
commencement of a project. 
Both India and Pakistan are obliged to follow prescribed principles and 
obligations under the IWT, which is a bilaterally agreed treaty between both 
sovereign states.263  To a large extent, water conflicts between India and 
Pakistan involve interpretation of treaty in the context of designs of Indian 
projects on the western waters, which are objected to by Pakistani authorities 
to ensure that their water supplies are not constricted within the true spirit of 
the IWT.264 
India argues that Pakistan only desires to increase the construction costs 
of Indian projects by levying stay orders, and consequently delaying 
construction works. 265   On the other hand, Pakistan argues that India is 
robbing Pakistan’s water supplies by constructing water management 
infrastructure over the western waters, and the designs of these projects are in 
                                                 
260 See Id. at Annexures D-E (noting the Indian obligation to share data at least six months before 
commencement of construction works).  
261 Mirza, supra note 211; see also Kishanganga, supra note 94. 
262 Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 13-14; see also Adeel, supra note 241; Jain, supra note 259; 
Iqbal, supra note 23.  
263 See generally Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29. 
264 See MICHAEL GILLAN & ROBERT LAMBERT, INDIA AND THE AGE OF CRISIS: THE LOCAL POLITICS 
OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL FRAGILITY 94-6 (2015); see generally ADEEL & WIRSING, 
supra note 22, at 98. 
265 Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213–14; see also Adeel, supra note 141, at 4; Adeel & Wirsing, 
supra note 22, at 98. 
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clear violation of the IWT. 266   Pakistan adds that India does not share 
concerned information in a timely manner about the designs and plans of the 
construction works, which is a blatant violation of the IWT, so Pakistan cannot 
effectively acquire resolution against illegitimate projects.267  India further 
uses the delaying tactic of bilateral talks, where negotiations go on for years 
over a single issue.268 
For these reasons, it is noted that these governmental tactics have 
adversely affected the dispute resolution mechanism of the IWT, since the 
resolution of a dispute under the IWT can take as long as nearly two decades 
to resolve a single issue.  After such a long span of time, usually the Indian 
construction works have been completed or nearly so.269 
The PIC and governmental negotiations, as dispute resolution 
mechanisms, 270  are cost-effective and therefore very much desirable. 271  
Nonetheless, these forums should not take decades to conclude their 
resolution of any difference or dispute.  Both forums should communicate 
their ability or inability in less than two years.  After that, the dispute should 
be resolved or referred to the higher dispute resolution forums of neutral 
expert and CoA, but only if information regarding water management projects 
is shared in a timely manner with Pakistan, that is, at least six months before 
commencement of any project; 272  only then can the dispute resolution 
mechanism be made more effective. 
Within this context, by understanding the nexus between the violation of 
the IWT and the inefficacy of dispute resolution mechanism, CoA in the 
Kishanganga project case established that India is obliged to exchange 
relevant information in a timely manner.273  More specifically, the court held 
that, in general, India should share the designs and plans of its construction 
works over the western rivers at least six months prior to the commencement 
of any construction works.274  In this sense, Pakistan would be satisfied with 
                                                 
266 PARENTI, supra note 24, at 129; Iqbal, supra note 23. 
267 Iqbal, supra note 23. 
268 The Third Pole, supra note 215. 
269 See also Adeel, supra note 141, at 4; Jain, supra note 259, at 940; Kokab & Nawaz, supra 140, at 
213–14; Kishanganga, supra note 94. 
270 Indus Water Treaty, supra note 29, at art. IX. 
271 MIRZA, supra note 211. 
272 For the Indian obligation to share data at least six months before commencement of construction 
works, see Indus Water Treaty, supra note 29, at art. VII, and Annexures D & E. 
273 Kishanganga, supra note 94. 
274 Id. 
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the compliance of these projects with the IWT, and would be better able to 
raise objections and subsequently acquire their resolutions in a timely and 
effective manner.275 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are certain legal mechanisms available in international law that can 
peacefully resolve water conflicts between nations.276  There is always an 
option for states to personally resolve their conflicts with diplomatic 
negotiations to resolve the tensions. 277   This method is usually the first 
available recourse to placate international tensions.278  This forum includes 
approaches such as diplomatic negotiations, mediation, fact-finding 
commissions, and other similar intermediary techniques; 279 this preliminary 
stage is nonbinding.280  There is a long list of water conflicts between India 
and Pakistan regarding Indian infrastructure on the western tributaries.281  
Pakistan is of the view that India is robbing Pakistan’s water supplies and 
building its water management capacity only as a political maneuver to gain 
political supremacy by practicing hydro-hegemony.282  On the other hand, 
India maintains that it is only constructing infrastructure within the scope of 
the IWT, and the decreased water flows in Pakistan are due to climate 
change. 283   Therefore, water disputes are routinely referred to the legal 
mechanism prescribed in the IWT.284 
For these reasons, both states are still facing certain challenges.  Within 
the parameters inscribed in the IWT, India believes that Pakistan has no basis 
for objecting to its construction works, to obtain stay orders, and to delay the 
                                                 
275 Id. 
276  For instance, dispute resolution through the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCoA) and the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
277 See Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at art. IX; Convention, supra note 40, at Art. 33; WEISS, 
supra note 14 at 128.  
278 See Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at art. IX; Convention, supra note 40, at Art. 33; WEISS, 
supra note 14 at 128.  
279 WEISS, supra note 14 at 128 
280 See generally S. K. SHAH, INDIA & ITS NEIGHBORS: RENEWED & NEW DIRECTIONS (VIJ BOOKS, 
2017). 
281 See generally Adeel & Wirsing, supra note 22.  
282 PARENTI, supra note 24; see also Iqbal, supra note 23. 
283 PARENTI, supra note 24.  
284 See generally Kishanganga, supra note 94. 
36
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol18/iss1/4
[Vol. 18: 75, 2018] Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
111 
 
construction works.285  Through these delays, the actual and opportunity costs 
of projects are borne by the Indian state, which is injuring Indian interests and 
economy.286  On the other side, Pakistan maintains that the dispute resolution 
mechanism is very slow, and by the time the case reaches the highest forum, 
either the project is completed or it has incurred so much cost that it cannot 
be held back.287  In addition, even if the court sides with issues raised by 
Pakistan, all it does is make slight changes to a few designs of Indian 
projects.288 
The Indian state is exasperated with Pakistan’s frequent objections and 
feels that the IWT is an impediment to its interests.289  Therefore, India has 
threatened that it will scrap the IWT entirely.290  In response, Pakistan has 
stated that such a revocation of a bilaterally-agreed treaty would be considered 
an act of war.291  To communicate state interests with regard to water disputes, 
the PIC is tasked with communicating with each state.292  This extraordinary 
intensity in political rigidity between Pakistan and India has an enshrined legal 
framework to alleviate water disputations.293 
To conclude, the mechanism of dispute resolution in the IWT involves 
several stages, which includes a permanent commission, a neutral expert, 
diplomatic negotiations, and international arbitration.294  The IWT has a four-
layer dispute resolution mechanism, where each layer encompasses a forum 
to settle the dispute peacefully.295  At the first stage, a permanent commission 
under the IWT resolves any question of fact that, if established, could violate 
the provisions of the IWT.296  The difference of interests and objections of a 
                                                 
285 See Id. 
286  Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213-14; see also Adeel, supra note 141, at 4; Jain et al., supra 
note 259, at 940.  
287 Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213-14; see also Adeel, supra note 141, at 4; Jain et al., supra 
note 259, at 940. 
288 Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213-14; see also Adeel, supra note 141, at 4; Jain et al., supra 
note 259, at 940. 
289 Kokab & Nawaz, supra note 140, at 213-14; see also Adeel, supra note 141, at 4; Jain et al., supra 
note 259, at 940. 
290 Chandio, supra note 27; see also Verma, supra note 27; Aziz, supra note 27. 
291 Aziz, supra note 27. 
292 Id.; Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 150-52. 
293 Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 150-52. 
294 Id. 
295 See Id. 
296 See Id. 
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party are termed a “question” at the first stage, which is to be resolved by the 
PIC. 297   If the commission fails to resolve the raised question, then a 
“difference” has arisen, and the difference between India and Pakistan under 
the IWT is to be determined by mediation, through a neutral expert, which is 
the second forum to resolve the issue.298  In the third stage, if the neutral expert 
fails to resolve the difference, then a dispute has arisen between these two 
states, and now the dispute is to be resolved by diplomatic negotiations 
between the parties to the IWT, by mediation, or by the Court of Arbitration 
(CoA), at the discretion of the PIC.299  This means that, if the dispute is not 
resolved by governmental negotiations or mediation, the fourth, and last, stage 
in the dispute resolution mechanism under the IWT is to resolve water 
disputes through the CoA.300  Stage four is the highest available forum under 
the IWT to resolve water conflicts between India and Pakistan.301  The CoA 
can rely on the IWT, international conventions to which both India and 
Pakistan are parties and customary international law.302 
This immersion of international law in the CoA is a platform to 
encompass emerging contemporary needs and issues, while accommodating 
developing water apportionment principles and rules.  For instance, in the 
Kishanganga case, the PCoA relied on the case law of the Pulp Mills case.303 
Alongside this, the multilayered dispute resolution of the IWT is in 
accordance with international laws and universally acclaimed rules.  For 
example, Article 33 of the UNWC also allows parties to use several stages of 
forums to resolve their disputes.304  Article 33 of the UNWC offers a range of 
dispute resolution mechanisms, which involve bilateral agreement, 
negotiations, mediation, conciliation, and obligatory fact-finding joint 
commissions.305  However, both India and Pakistan have concerns with the 
UNWC, most specifically with the binding and compulsory nature of Article 
33.306 
                                                 
297 See Id. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. 
301 See Id. 
302 Id. at 210-22. 
303 Kishanganga, supra note 94. 
304 Convention, supra note 40, at 713-14. 
305 Id.  
306 Hamid Sarfraz, Revisiting the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, 38 WATER INT’L 204, 211 (2013). 
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Moreover, the multilayered dispute resolution under the IWT reflects 
acceptable forums and techniques of international law and globally practiced 
customs.  For example, under the IWT, the role of a neutral expert for 
mediation, the obligation of the PIC as a permanent joint fact-finding 
commission, the involvement of mediation and negotiations as diplomatic 
negotiations and mediation, and the establishment of the CoA, 307  are all 
reflections of widely used dispute resolution mechanisms for water conflicts 
around the world. 
It is pertinent to note that the dispute-resolution mechanism under the 
IWT undertakes both juridical and non-judicial techniques to settle 
differences and disputes between India and Pakistan.  By allowing a four-layer 
legal dispute-resolution framework, 308  the IWT encompasses almost all 
binding and nonbinding legal procedures to settle water conflicts,309 except 
for the dispute resolution forum of the ICJ since the IWT deliberately does 
not accommodate ICJ as a legal forum to settle disputes.310  Apart from this, 
the IWT gives substantial consideration to bilateral agreements and 
diplomatic negotiations as a nonbinding forum to settle disputes311 and it 
allows arbitration and the neutral expert as binding procedures to resolve 
water disputes between India and Pakistan.312 
It is noted through the discussion in this paper that Pakistan is currently 
facing two major problems with the dispute resolution-mechanism.  The first 
issue is that India commences its construction works without informing 
Pakistan, which delays the possibility to raise issues in a timely manner.313  
By the time Pakistan is formally informed of the design and plans of the 
project on the western rivers, India has substantially completed its works and 
has incurred so much cost that hydraulic projects cannot be held back.314  This 
practice is against the obligation under the IWT,315 where India is obligated 
to share data regarding any planned works on the western rivers as soon as 
                                                 
307 See Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 146-52, 170-202. 
308 See Id. at 150-52. 
309 For example, the negotiation and Commission procedures are nonbinding and the neutral expert 
and Court of Arbitration procedures are binding in nature as mechanisms of dispute resolution.  See 
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 150-52. 
310 See Id. 
311 See Id. 
312 Id. 
313 MIRZA, supra note 211, at 16. 
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possible.316  The second issue is that the dispute-resolution mechanism itself 
is a very slow framework, which can take more than a decade to resolve a 
single issue.  Experts have noted that these reasons delay justice, and the delay 
in the provision of information on designs and plans from the Indian side 
adversely affects Pakistani interests.  This defeats the purpose of any dispute-
resolution mechanism.317 
As obligated under the IWT,318 if India does not violate this bilaterally-
agreed treaty and share relevant information of designs and planning of 
construction works with Pakistan in a timely manner at least six months before 
the commencement of construction works, 319  the dispute-resolution 
mechanism can quickly resolve water conflicts between India and Pakistan. 
India argues that Pakistan only desires to increase the construction costs 
of Indian projects by levying stay orders, which consequently delay 
construction works.320  However, this Indian concern can be easily resolved if 
the designs of Indian projects are shared in a timely manner with Pakistan, so 
that any difference or dispute can be resolved even before the commencement 
of a project.  Furthermore, Pakistan argues that India is robbing Pakistan’s 
water supplies by constructing water-management infrastructure on the 
western waters, even though the designs of these projects are in clear violation 
of the IWT.321  Pakistan adds that India does not share concerned information 
in a timely manner on the designs and plans of construction works, which is 
in blatant violation of the IWT, so that Pakistan cannot effectively acquire 
resolution against illegitimate projects.322   India further uses the delaying 
tactic of bilateral talks, where negotiations go on for years over a single 
issue.323 
For these reasons, it can be determined that these governmental tactics 
have adversely affected the dispute-resolution mechanism of the IWT, since 
                                                 
316 IWT establishes that India is obliged to inform Pakistan of any relevant construction works at least 
six months before its commencement.  See Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 144-45, 170-86, 
186-202. 
317 See MIRZA, supra note 211. 
318 For the Indian obligation to share data at least six months before commencement of construction 
works, see Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 29, at 144-45, 170-86, 186-202. 
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the resolution of a dispute under the IWT can take as long as nearly two 
decades.  After such a long span of time, the Indian construction works are 
usually completed or nearly so.324 
To hasten the dispute-resolution mechanism, the forums of bilateral talks 
and negotiations, and PIC should not take decades to conclude their resolution 
of any difference or dispute.  Both forums should communicate their ability 
or inability in less than two years.  After that, the dispute should be resolved 
or referred to the higher dispute-resolution forums of the neutral expert or the 
CoA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
324 See ADEEL, supra note 141, at 5; see also JAIN ET. AL., supra note 259, at 940; Kokab & Nawaz, 
supra note 140, at 213–14; Kishenganga, supra note 94.  
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